

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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**FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SIXTY-FIFTH MEETING**

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Friday, 3 August 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN

(United Arab Republic)

62-20313

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil

Mr. ARAUJO CASTRO  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE  
Miss MAUD GOES

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. N. MINTCHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. M. ZEMIA  
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU  
ATO M. HAMID  
ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATTI  
Mr. C. COSTA REGHINI  
Mr. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd.)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI  
Mr. F.B. KOSOKO

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS  
Mr. S. ROGULSKI  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. H. FLORESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
General P. KALLIN  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. L.I. MENDELEVICH  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV  
Mr. V.V. ALDOSHIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN  
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN  
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID  
Mr. M.S. AHMED

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. B.T. PRICE

Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. A. AKALOVSKY

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Secretary-General:Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I declare open the sixty-fifth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. ALAMAYEHU (Ethiopia): As this is my first intervention in the discussions of the Committee, may I take this opportunity to say how greatly honoured and privileged I feel to be participating in these negotiations with so many distinguished personalities?

On behalf of my delegation, I should like to extend a warm welcome to the Minister for Defence of Nigeria, who joined this Committee after me. I would ask the members of the Committee to bear with me if some of my observations this morning appear to be of a general nature; as a late-comer, I am unable to avoid that. Having made those preliminary remarks, I shall now proceed to make my statement.

I should like to associate myself with the representatives who have spoken before me in expressing the hope that this Conference will live up to the great task entrusted to it and to the anxious expectation of the peoples throughout the world. Equally, I join those representatives who have spoken with appreciation of the efforts being made by the great Powers to narrow the differences separating the two alliances on this vital question of general and complete disarmament.

In that connexion the move made by the Soviet Union towards narrowing those differences should be recognized as an encouraging gesture of its good will and of its desire to achieve agreement. Also, the promise given by the representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom that they would be putting forward a proposal during the current session should be considered encouraging. We hope that when that proposal is made it will be one which will bring us still nearer to our objective with regard to an agreement on a test ban.

We in the Ethiopian delegation believe that there is a better prospect now for achieving agreement on general and complete disarmament than at any time since the advent of the armaments race in the era after the Second World War. It is true that, far from there being a sign of relaxation in the armaments race itself, there appears unfortunately to be a tendency towards the intensification of that race, towards the perfection of the destructive capabilities of deadly war machines and towards the widening of the fields of conflict. If one considers, however, the general climate of world public opinion and the overall propitious conditions in which the present negotiations are being conducted, one feels rather more optimistic now than at any other time in the history of disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

What are those propitious conditions which could help us towards arriving at an agreed solution of the disarmament problem? In the first place, the acceptance by both sides of general and complete disarmament, not as a remote and distant objective towards the achievement of which States should strive, but as an actual and immediate subject on which to negotiate and conclude a treaty, is a step in the right direction. As representatives know, attempts made in the past to reach agreement on partial disarmament had invariably failed, mainly because the objective -- that is, partial disarmament -- was a difficult one to attain. There is in fact an inherent contradiction in partial disarmament, namely, to disarm and to arm at one and the same time; to arm, but not as much as one wants to. That, of course, is a very difficult and complicated affair. Partial disarmament is no disarmament at all; it is a regulation of armament; and, if such regulation has been difficult in the past, it is impossible today.

So general and complete disarmament, apart from its enormous and lasting benefits to humanity, apart from any new horizon of life it opens to mankind, is, we have been told, technically simpler to achieve even than partial disarmament, and much more so to control. So the acceptance by all parties concerned of general and complete disarmament as a subject on which to negotiate and to conclude a concrete treaty is in itself helpful.

The second reason for our optimism is the fact that we have now a joint statement (ENDC/5) by the two principal Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, containing all the essential principles accepted by both parties as the basis for negotiating and concluding a treaty on general and complete disarmament. What are those agreed principles? They are the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; the establishment of an effective system of international inspection and control with access to all places as necessary, for the purpose of effective verification; the dismantling of military establishments, including bases; the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, as well as their means of delivery; and the establishment of a United Nations peace force capable of ensuring peace and security in a disarmed world.

All those principles and others, which had been the ones most contested by one party or the other and which formed a stumbling block to all disarmament negotiations in the past, are included in the joint statement of agreed principles and are now

(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

no longer a problem. That problem is settled, a fact which should help us in the solution of the next problems, namely, the establishment of an agreed sequence for the various disarmament measures and the elaboration of the accepted principles into a concrete and detailed treaty.

Thirdly, the participation in these negotiations of the representatives of eight nations not aligned with either military alliance and representing the views of the majority of the peoples in their respective geographical areas should, I believe, help in reconciling differences between the positions maintained by the two parties. The vital interest with which those eight nations are identified is no other than to see a treaty on general and complete disarmament concluded as rapidly as possible and peace and security guaranteed for all throughout the world -- a world free from nuclear and thermonuclear nightmare.

The eight nations -- I am sure my friends from the non-aligned countries will agree with me in this -- cannot have an interest in one Power or group of Powers gaining military advantages over another Power or group of Powers. Ethiopia for one is firmly opposed to such a situation, because we know very well that it is such military advantages held by one Power and its allies over the opposing party which has always in history been the breeding-ground for the armaments race, and which is at the very root of the dangerous situation today.

That being so, I believe that the participation in these negotiations of representatives of the eight nations -- who are free from any emotional involvement in these particular questions and are unfettered by considerations of national prestige or suspicion -- in offering what they thought to be equitable compromises presents a unique opportunity if only both they, the representatives of the eight nations and the parties to the military alliances, will take advantage of it.

Lastly, at no other time hitherto has world public opinion ever been so unanimous as it is today in condemning the armaments race, and so conscious of the urgent need to stop it through the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty on general and complete disarmament. The peoples of the world, including the great majority in the United States and in the Soviet Union as well as the peoples of their respective allies, are anxious to see that great objective achieved without any further delay.

(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

I do not wish to dwell at length on this particular point, since the many conferences and demonstrations taking place in different countries throughout the world, and the incessant appeals being made jointly or individually by prominent citizens in every walk of life, are living testimony to what I have just said about it, and therefore no further argument or elaboration by me is required. I do wish to add, however, that this anxiety of the peoples of the world, this urgent demand of world public opinion to see an end put to this dangerous situation through the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty on general and complete disarmament is an important and helpful element which should be given serious consideration in the evaluation of the respective positions maintained by the two sides.

Those four elements therefore offer advantages which previous disarmament negotiators did not have, and that is why my delegation feels optimistic that we may achieve better results in the present negotiations. But those helpful elements and favourable conditions can be wasted, and we may not have another opportunity to use them if we do not do so now. We are living in a fast-changing world, and views, positions and circumstances change too. We may not get the same views, the same positions or the same favourable circumstances when we come together again -- if we come together again at all. We should therefore leave no stone unturned to find some way leading to possible reconciliation of the existing differences now, before it is too late. The question is, how? The most natural way to achieve that is, of course, through mutual efforts and concessions by the parties concerned; then, where differences persist, through the acceptance of compromise suggestions or proposals offered by others.

With regard to the delegations of the eight non-aligned nations, permit me to say just a few words about the position as I see it, and I hope those delegations will not mind my doing so. In my view their position is not so easy; it is perhaps even more difficult than the positions of the two parties, for the following reasons. Because they are not committed to one or other of the military alliances, as I said earlier, those delegations are expected by the peoples of the world to reconcile differences by making proposals and suggestions in order to achieve the speedy conclusion of a disarmament treaty. On the other hand, they are extremely restrained in doing so because what they consider to be fair and equitable proposals or suggestions might not be taken as such by one or other of the military alliances.

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In other words, while their responsibility before the peoples of the world, which expect them to help in achieving a speedy and agreed solution of the disarmament problem, weighs heavily upon them, their reluctance to hurt the feelings and the prestige of the two great alliances, for which they have deep respect and high regard, has placed them in a very delicate and difficult position. Their task could, of course, be greatly facilitated if the two sides would exert still greater efforts and demonstrate their readiness to make mutual, determined moves to meet each other halfway. My delegation earnestly hopes that that will be possible in the weeks ahead.

At the beginning of my intervention I expressed appreciation of the efforts being made by the great Powers to narrow the differences between their respective positions. While that is generally true with regard to questions of procedure, it would be less than frank on my part -- and, I think, on the part of other delegations, for that matter -- not to recognize the fact that in matters of substance the positions of the two sides are still almost as far apart as they were at the start of the present negotiations. Five months of negotiations and reflexion have passed. We have a very short time left before we report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the agreement reached, as required of us by the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. But so far very little progress towards reaching agreement has been made. Both sides have stood firm by what they call the safeguarding of their national interests and national rights. Each side seems to be determined to get agreement on its terms or to let the world go to its doom.

Unfortunately that seems to be the true picture of the situation as it stands today.

May I, with all due respect to the great Powers, draw attention to the fact that it would not be their interests and their rights alone which would be at stake in a nuclear war? The interests and rights of other nations and peoples -- in fact, the interests and rights of all nations and peoples -- would be involved in any nuclear war; therefore there would be no legal or moral justification for taking measures leading to such a war in order to safeguard national interests or rights, inasmuch as that would infringe the rights and interests of other nations and peoples. In fact, nuclear war would constitute an attack not only on nations and peoples of the present day but also on their past civilization, as well as on future generations -- in other words, it would be a war against mankind and civilization in general.

(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

All these considerations must lead to one conclusion, and one only -- that preparations for a nuclear war must be stopped. The great Powers must exert further determined efforts to remove their differences and come to agreement, so that the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament may be achieved. That would not seem to be beyond the bounds of possibility, since, as I said a moment ago, there is a good prospect of reaching agreement on the basis of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles; in fact, those principles cover the entire field of disarmament envisaged in the comprehensive treaty to be signed. It seems to us that what remains to be done is to establish an agreed order or sequence for the various disarmament measures to be included in the three stages and to set time-limits for the completion of general and complete disarmament, including each of its three stages.

To that end the Soviet Union and the United States have already submitted their draft programmes (ENDC/2, 30) for general and complete disarmament, which we have studied carefully, as it is our duty to do. Those documents show, as far as we in the Ethiopian delegation are able to see, the underlying mutual fears and suspicions which exist between the two sides in this Committee. They further reflect the different strategic approaches to general and complete disarmament that the two parties have adopted. In this situation neither side dare go forward and adopt measures which the other side opposes lest the other party retain, in the subsequent stages, military capabilities for rear attack. This reminds me of a saying we have in Ethiopia. I am sure my colleagues have better ones in their respective countries, illustrating similar situations. Our saying runs something like this: "Those who suspect each other walk side by side, but never one before the other". That, I believe, characterizes the situation, and the suspicion and mistrust with which East and West look at each other in this matter.

In the circumstances efforts must be made to devise some way so that both may go together, side by side; so that each side may not feel that the other side is behind it with something it does not have. I do not intend, nor do I think it appropriate to try, to elaborate on how such a way could be devised. I would wish, however, to make some suggestions, to submit some ideas, which my delegation believes might be helpful to the Committee, and particularly to the two co-Chairmen

(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

in their search for appropriate formulae acceptable to the parties and leading to the solution of the problem: but before I do that I should like to say just a few words on where I think some of our difficulties lie.

We have a number of documents, some of them basic and others in a different category, but all of them very important and helpful. We have, first of all, the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of the Soviet Union and the United States, which is the basis for our negotiations. We have the two disarmament plans, that of the Soviet Union and that of the United States; we have document ENDC/50, incorporating the United Kingdom proposals; and we have the Bulgarian draft (ENDC/L.17 Rev.1) and the United States draft (ENDC/L.18) of article 4 in the respective plans. No doubt all those documents are, as I have said, very important and meritorious. No doubt they are all intended to guide us to one single objective -- that is, the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

However, because of the different approaches adopted in those documents in dealing with a single subject it seems -- at least to my delegation -- that it would be difficult for us to move towards the achievement of the objective sought as speedily as the situation demands. It is clear from the discussions that have taken place, even in the last few days, on point 5(a) of document ENDC/52 that approaches to the various topics seem still to be made from the vantage point of measures envisaged under the respective plans. Statements made by one side or the other in explanation and amplification of positions on different topics lay more stress on the difficulties themselves than on their possible solution.

I recognize that the issues to be resolved in the quest for a solution are complex and require a delicate balance of tangible and intangible factors in a broader context of a balance of forces. I recognize the enormous difficulty involved in trying to disengage the various tangible and intangible factors that are tangled and tied up together. But I think that that difficulty has been increased as a result of lack of a common criterion for the establishment of an order or sequence for the various measures of disarmament to be included in the first and subsequent stages.

The two plans submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union seem, as I have said, to have adopted different approaches to disarmament in the first stage -- that of the United States a percentage approach and that of the Soviet Union a

(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

qualitative approach, if I may say so -- but they do not carry the process to its logical end. The percentage approach in the United States plan covers only conventional armaments, armed forces and certain types of carriers of weapons of mass destruction, while the approach in the Soviet plan covers only all carriers of weapons of mass destruction, foreign bases and foreign troops. In speaking of the Soviet plan I did not include the Soviet views on conventional armaments and armed forces, because the Soviet Union has lately accepted the viewpoint of the Western Powers.

In the humble opinion of the Ethiopian delegation, no balance could be established and maintained for the disarmament measures to be undertaken in the first stage, or for those to be delayed to subsequent stages, if either of the two approaches were to be adopted as it is. Nevertheless the Committee might adopt as a criterion either the percentage or the qualitative approach to disarmament for the first stage if it were to be modified. A percentage approach could be adopted as a criterion, if the Committee wished, if it covered not just parts but the entire area of disarmament in such a manner that not only would the measures to be taken in the first stage be balanced, but also the level reached thereafter would remain balanced and frozen to subsequent stages.

Alternatively, the Committee might wish to adopt as a criterion the qualitative approach. According to that criterion each side would select those disarmament and related measures with regard to the military objects it considered most dangerous and most essential to be delayed to subsequent stages, and the measures so selected by each side would be combined in a package, in a balanced manner, to be disposed of or dealt with as appropriate, and simultaneously, in the first stage. Such disarmament and related measures as I have indicated in this second alternative would be so balanced between those selected by each side and of such a nature as to ensure security for both sides, to facilitate the process of general and complete disarmament in the subsequent stages and to give a sense of security and relief to the peoples of the world. I know that this second alternative criterion is an admittedly decisive and drastic one, but I am sure everybody agrees with me that the situation in which we live demands that such a drastic measure be taken.

(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

I know too that there are objections from both sides to taking such drastic measures in the first stage at this time, and for very good reasons such as the fear of spying, as well as lack of confidence on one side or the other. But in our view, while it is admittedly necessary to take all possible measures against such possibilities, those reasons, however sound, do not seem to be sufficient to stand in the way of an agreement between the two parties to save the world from nuclear catastrophe. What is more, one cannot have confidence in something before that something has been put to the test. It is the considered opinion of my delegation, therefore, that a decision on such a common criterion is a necessary prerequisite for any fruitful discussion, and especially for the discussion and elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Despite the risk of being charged with over-simplifying a complex problem, my delegation believes that this simultaneity of approach to disarmament, as suggested in the second alternative, would also help, if not to eliminate, at least to reduce suspicion. My delegation would, naturally, like to see that second alternative adopted, since it would be in keeping with our position in the United Nations as co-sponsors of draft resolutions banning the use, production or dissemination of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. But since we know that, in the final analysis, it is the agreement of the great Powers which will control the matter and that consequently it would be unrealistic to insist on our choice, my delegation will co-operate with all the other delegations in examining other suggestions or proposals acceptable to the two sides, proposals which, at the same time, would not lose sight of the main objective which we all seek to achieve. In any case, I hope that the Committee and the two co-Chairmen will give favourable consideration to the humble suggestions which I have made on behalf of my delegation.

In concluding these brief remarks I should like not only to congratulate Mrs. Myrdal, the head of the Swedish delegation, on the remarkable and carefully-studied statement which she made at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.64, page 5 ), but also to record the full support of my delegation for her conclusions about the urgent necessity for a test ban treaty. In this connexion my delegation also gives its full support to the suggestions of the representatives of Mexico and Brazil.

Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): Before I begin what I had intended to say, I should like to congratulate the representative of Ethiopia on his comprehensive and searching analysis of the problems which face us. I also wish to extend to the Defence Minister of Nigeria and to our Ethiopian colleague a warm welcome to this Committee. What we have heard from both of them gives promise of constructive and fruitful co-operation in our future work.

I make no apology for taking the floor today to talk about what the representative of Sweden on Wednesday, 1 August, called "the most pressing of our tasks" (ENDC/PV.64, page 5), the cessation of nuclear tests. It requires no apology because my delegation holds the view that this subject is always on our agenda, since it forms an integral and extremely important part of general and complete disarmament. We remain unrepentant in our view that there can be no real progress towards general and complete disarmament until nuclear tests have been ended. This is not just our view. Time and again, intelligent persons whom I keep meeting in Europe and in Asia have asked me: "How can you be talking about general and complete disarmament when you cannot even stop the nuclear tests?" It is a good question. Unable to provide an effective answer, I have given it up as an impossible task. But I would go further and ask each representative here to ponder over this question and search his heart for the answer. I submit that the only possible conclusion is that there is in fact no answer, except to hang our heads in shame.

After all, as so many of our non-aligned colleagues have reminded us recently, nuclear tests are not just a symptom of armaments, like the thunder of artillery on a firing range or the roar of a supersonic bomber. They do not test existing weapons. They create, they breed, new and more terrible weapons of mass destruction; they instil greater fears in the hearts both of those who carry them out and of their opponents, as also in the hearts of the vast majority of humanity who are helpless victims of this suicidal mania which afflicts the nuclear Powers. I sometimes wonder whether those who are responsible for the continuance of nuclear tests realize what a tiny proportion of the world's population they constitute, and therefore what a great responsibility they assume.

As the Foreign Minister of Canada said here on 24 July:

"All this testing is sheer madness, polluting the air human beings must breathe, endangering the lives of generations yet unborn and possibly leading to the destruction of civilization." (ENDC/PV.60, p.26)

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

In short, all nuclear tests are nothing short of aggression against humanity. Every new nuclear explosion drives disarmament more and more into the background. Knowing all this, is it any matter for surprise that the man in the street should ask of us: "How can you be talking about general and complete disarmament when you cannot even stop the nuclear tests?"

What makes a rational answer impossible is that the world knows that nuclear tests are very much easier to detect and to identify than armaments. With the possible exception of the smallest underground tests, whose military value seems doubtful, nuclear tests have a habit of announcing themselves. If, with that tremendous advantage, we are unable to put an end to nuclear tests for ever, it is difficult to see how we can hope to make any progress towards general and complete disarmament.

We believe that the question of the cessation of nuclear tests is ripe for solution. We believe that all the elements required to work out an agreement have long been present. If, in spite of all this, nuclear tests are to continue, as we have been told by both sides that they must, it can only be that the will to put an end to the tests is absent; and, if that will is absent in regard to nuclear tests, my delegation submits that it does not really make too much sense for us to be discussing either the Soviet plan (ENDC/2) or the United States plan (ENDC/30) or any other plan of general and complete disarmament. I am afraid that the sophisticated arguments to the contrary with which the nuclear Powers try to comfort themselves leave us quite unmoved and unconvinced.

Three and a half months have passed since the eight non-aligned delegations present here put forward their compromise proposal (ENDC/28) on the nuclear test ban agreement. During that time that unfortunate proposal of ours has been treated like one of those volley-balls which holiday-makers toss lightly to each other on the beach. The two sides have not even got down to sitting around it to examine it more closely and thoroughly, and this despite the mounting evidence that the basic assumptions of the memorandum are valid. The most valuable contribution made by our Swedish colleague last Wednesday shows clearly how sadly neglected has been the opportunity provided by our joint memorandum.

My delegation remains convinced that that memorandum can serve as the basis of an early over-all agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. We would plead with all the earnestness and emphasis at our command that, during the four weeks or so

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

that remain to us before we report to the Disarmament Commission, we give maximum concentration to this question of the stoppage of nuclear tests. We must show some results to a despairing and cynical world, and this is the field not only in which it is the most possible to get somewhere but the one also in which, in existing circumstances, the relief afforded would have the greatest impact. If we fail here we shall have no right to complain about those who have described our efforts as "an exercise in futility".

Some of our colleagues, obviously suffering the same pangs of frustration and disillusion as ourselves, have come forward with what might be dubbed -- and I know they will not misunderstand me -- as concessions to the nuclear devil. Our Mexican colleague, Dr. Padilla Nervo, has fought for the immediate and unconditional stoppage of nuclear tests ever since they were born. I can well imagine what mental anguish he must have undergone in coming to the conclusion that the nuclear Powers, like naughty boys, needed to be given a few more sweets, in which they had already over-indulged, in the hope that the consequent indigestion would cure them for ever; and our Brazilian colleague, afflicted in the same manner, has proposed that the same naughty boys should perhaps not have all their dangerous toys taken away from them at once, but that the process should be staggered. It is indeed a sad reflection on the times in which we live that such peace-loving gentlemen should have felt that they had to come forward with these compromises. But, like them, we are realists. We believe that the concessions and sacrifices would be worth while if they helped to put us on the road leading to a complete test ban. We accordingly support both those proposals, and commend them to the nuclear Sub-Committee.

In conclusion I should like to dispel any impression that my delegation is interested only in a nuclear test ban and not in general and complete disarmament. We are, of course, vitally interested in general and complete disarmament, and we recognize that there can, in fact, be no true peace for us until the world is completely disarmed; but, as I have said, we look on a nuclear test ban as part of, and the first essential major step in, disarmament. It is our view that, as long as that step is not taken, anything and everything we do here to move ahead on general and complete disarmament will remain blocked.

So once again we appeal to the great nuclear Powers to put aside their fears, their suspicions and their pride, and to resolve during the next few weeks to show to a world which looks to them for enlightened leadership that they can be great in every sense of the word.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): At the end of his speech before our Committee last Wednesday, the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, made the following statement:-

"While it is easy to make speeches which appeal to the emotions with regard to the things we want to do, what we must do is find the practical ways of doing them." (ENDC/PV.64, p.48)

Though that assertion is apt to arouse various comments, I will set them aside now while agreeing with its essence. Indeed, when searching for ways of attaining a world without wars and arms we must select the most practical ones to prevent us from plunging into interminable debates only to end, as did those held in the former League of Nations, with a war and surprise attacks. We must select ways to lead us directly, quickly and unmistakably to our final goal, general and complete disarmament.

Our negotiations here have now reached the phase of working out the measures to be undertaken by States at different stages of the disarmament process. I wish to point out that an essential step in that respect is the liquidation in the very first stage of all nuclear delivery vehicles. A first aspect of this item concerns the possibility of such a measure. The liquidation of all nuclear delivery vehicles must be completed in the course of the very first stage of general and complete disarmament, for in that way we can accomplish the objective of general and complete disarmament which determined the creation of our Committee and, generally speaking, turned the problem of disarmament into the most urgent issue of our time, namely, the elimination as soon as possible of the danger of a nuclear war. Nobody looking with a feeling of responsibility and seriousness at the issue of disarmament can ever dispute such a necessity. Therefore we think that there is a scientific objective and sure criterion for our appraisal of different ways of taking up this issue, namely, to define to what extent one proposal or another promotes or, on the contrary, hinders or blocks the liquidation in the shortest possible time of all nuclear delivery vehicles, and thereby, practically, the removal of the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

Before passing on to the analysis of the two stands made clear during our debates with regard to this measure, I consider that it will not be at all useless if I also insist, as other delegations have done, on an idea which expresses an ineluctable reality. In our negotiations we must bear in mind that qualitatively a

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

new fact of exceptional importance has arisen in the field of the development of armaments -- the emergence of thermonuclear weapons. That event not only has overthrown old strategic and tactical theories but also has confronted mankind with an exceedingly serious danger. That is why we who have been working in this room for some three-and-a-half months must abandon, when discussing the issue of disarmament, all ideas which do not correspond to present realities. We must work with new concepts and ideas emerging from an objective interpretation of reality.

It seems to me that in this room views are sometimes voiced which do not take into consideration those real facts -- the evolution of mankind, society and technique -- and that there have been attempts to solve the problems of the second half of the twentieth century using methods suitable for the time of Cromwell, of Marshal Vaubon, the inventor of the bayonet, and Napoleon, or even for the time of the Second World War. If it is not understood, or if one refuses to understand, that the thermonuclear weapon constitutes the main danger to humanity, and that its elimination is a problem of life and death for mankind, then our negotiations are bound to be diverted from the cause that generated them and from the goal to be achieved.

Allow me now to touch upon the ways of approach put forward in this Committee concerning the elimination in the first stage of all thermonuclear weapon delivery vehicles. According to the first concept -- which is that of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2) to which we wholeheartedly adhere and we should be glad if it were shared also by those of our colleagues who are still opposed to it -- it is, I submit, possible and necessary for all nuclear delivery vehicles to be destroyed even in the first stage. Thus the nightmare threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war would not hang over mankind any more. The danger of war by accident becoming a greater threat day by day would be made practically impossible. The possibility of the unleashing of a surprise attack would be virtually removed, as there would be not only no special means for using nuclear weapons but equally no big battleships -- surface vessels or submarines -- no bombers, and so on.

A considerable relaxation in tension in international relations would be created. The feeling of a lack of security, which today characterizes international relations to a large extent, would be reduced. Indeed, those relations cannot be normal as long as the distance between American and Soviet territory can, according

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to the experts' estimates, be covered by rockets in twenty minutes, and a nuclear attack on Romania could be launched in as little as four minutes from the NATO military bases set up in the vicinity of that country.

I hope that the representative of the United Kingdom will not qualify this as an appeal to the emotions. It is a real and very concrete fact which we must take into account. But how long is such a situation to last and, moreover, how long will it still be possible to maintain peace when the perfecting of carrier vehicles leads to a permanent shortening of the time necessary to deliver nuclear weapons to their targets?

The danger facing humanity which emerges with the existence of those means of delivery is without precedent in history. Therefore we need ways of tackling the problems of disarmament, which also do not have, as they cannot have, any precedent in history either. The only way of tackling the problems which can be considered as satisfactory is the way of a radical solution. Or, to put the same idea in other words, only a radical solution can solve our problems satisfactorily.

The other concept, which the representatives of the Western Powers are trying to defend here, the concept of a gradual approach, is unacceptable, for it not only does not solve the problem but aggravates it. On the basis of that theory the Western Powers suggest to us the reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles by 30 per cent. We have repeatedly demonstrated that it is not the percentage that we are interested in, because we stand for the total elimination of those delivery means in the very first stage. However, since the reduction by 30 per cent has been proposed, let us take up that aspect of the problem.

Today there are in the world thermonuclear weapons with so great a power of destruction that they represent an average of 80 tons of explosive to every human being. If, instead of 100 units for the delivery of nuclear weapons --- and I am including here rockets, aircraft, warships, submarines, and so on --- we have only 70 units, does that mean that the danger of the annihilation of mankind has essentially diminished? No, positively not.

At the present time there exist the means for delivering the equivalent of 80 tons of explosive to every human being. If we reduce the vehicles by 30 per cent it means that the equivalent of 56 tons of explosive for every human being, instead of 80 tons, can be delivered to targets. I think that everyone here is aware of the reality hiding behind those cold figures. On the other hand, while 30 per cent of

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the means of delivery would be destroyed, their production would still go on. It goes without saying that it is not the out-of-date or obsolete or anachronic types which would be produced -- since they are the victims of what is technically called "moral wear" --, but the most up-to-date types able to carry still greater loads of bombs and so on.

To the United States delegation one single fact is of essential importance in this respect, as was said by Mr. Stelle only two days ago, on 1 August; namely, "... that agreed production allowances should not permit a significant alteration of the 'weapons mix' which exists at the time a treaty becomes effective." (ENDC/PV.64, p.39)

What is the real significance of this proposal? The answer is obvious. The continuance of the arms race, nuclear arms included, according to the rules of the game of respecting what the United States delegation calls the "weapons mix". The reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles by 30 per cent thus in fact lacks any practical importance, because the total capacity of the delivery of nuclear weapons to their targets is preserved and even increased. Whereas the famous Penelope destroyed overnight what she had woven in the daytime, the United States plan proposes that what it destroys with one hand it may restore with the other.

Now let us touch upon a third aspect of the problem. If such a reduction by 30 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles were to take place, the remaining 70 per cent could be delivered to easily-identifiable targets, for under the system of the United States draft plan the location of all objectives which might be of interest to an aggressor would be perfectly easy to identify during the first three years of the first stage under the pretext of verifying the 30 per cent reduction. In those circumstances, under the United States system an aggressor State would dispose of more nuclear weapons with a destructive power higher than at the beginning of stage I, and of delivery vehicles virtually equal, if not superior, to whose existing at the beginning of stage I. And it would have the advantage -- which at present it has not -- of knowing exactly the location of objectives intended to be attacked. The present critical situation would be not only maintained but even aggravated. That is why the "gradual approach" is unacceptable, as is any proposal embodying such a concept.

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If we want general and complete disarmament we must do away in the first stage with the possibility of nuclear war. We must take a radical step: either the destruction in the first stage of all nuclear arms, which is precisely what was proposed by the socialist countries in 1960 and rejected by the Western Powers, or the liquidation of the means of delivering those arms to their targets, which is what we have proposed and are proposing now. The Western Powers, however, reject that solution too.

The representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, feeling the groundlessness of the objections raised by his delegation against the proposal to liquidate all nuclear delivery vehicles in the very first stage, voiced a new objection on 1 August when he said:

"... we cannot define vehicles as those capable or not capable of delivering nuclear weapons;" (ENDC/PV.64 p.35)

He said that that was so since many types of arms could be used either in a nuclear war or as conventional armaments.

Before remarking on the inconsistency of such an objection, I take the liberty of pointing out that Mr. Stelle is in contradiction with Mr. McCloy and Mr. Dean, as well as with the United States Government, for they found no difficulty in distinguishing conventional armaments from nuclear delivery vehicles. Indeed, in the joint Soviet-United States statement of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5) -- adopted on 20 December 1961 by the United Nations General Assembly in a resolution (A/RES/1722 (XVI)) which was supported by all the States represented here -- point 3(a) refers to conventional armaments, whereas point 3(c) refers to "Elimination of all means of delivery of arms of mass destruction" to their target.

Now let us suppose that in some cases it would be difficult to distinguish nuclear delivery vehicles from certain types of conventional weapons. If there were such difficulties they could undoubtedly be overcome on just one condition -- the existence not of a good definition but of the will to destroy nuclear delivery vehicles in the very first stage. As for weapons which might be used as delivery vehicles for nuclear armaments as well, it is clear that such weapons are to be destroyed in the first stage of general and complete disarmament. The real problem is that we must agree on the goal for the first stage. Do we or do we not want to eliminate the danger of nuclear war in the very first stage? If the answer is in the affirmative let us say so, and let those who are to implement the treaty on

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general and complete disarmament tackle the task of liquidating all nuclear delivery vehicles. If we hold up our proceedings in order to search for a definition which all experts might accept as "perfect", we shall run the risk of duplicating the sad record set up by the League of Nations, which kept discussing the difference between defensive and offensive weapons until the Second World War broke out.

The statement made at our last meeting by Mr. Stelle constitutes standing proof that it is not the alleged impossibility of telling nuclear delivery vehicles from conventional armaments that constitutes the real reason for the opposition of the Western Powers to the proposal to liquidate nuclear delivery vehicles right from the very first stage. Mr. Stelle said then:

"Even given reasonable answers to the questions which we have cited above ..." --

he was referring to the question of definition --

"... and to the many analogous questions which those answers themselves may raise, it appears to us that it will still be impossible to reach an agreement on the basis of Soviet proposals which would meet the legitimate concerns of all parties. Not the least among the factors which leads us to that conclusion is the fact that the Soviet plan -- whatever Mr. Zorin says -- would cause major strategic imbalances during the course of disarmament." (ibid., p.37)

Here, at last, is one of the real reasons for the opposition of the United States delegation. It is the much discussed disadvantage for the Western Powers allegedly implied by the liquidation of nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I.

The Romanian delegation, like the delegations of all socialist nations represented here, firmly stands for respecting the principle of balanced disarmament in the process of general and complete disarmament. We consider that that principle is part of the very notion of general disarmament. Disarmament must be general precisely in order to prevent the emergence of a disadvantage to the detriment of a State, or group of States, which disarmed while others did not.

But also with regard to balance there are two concepts which are opposed one to the other. One stands for a balance in disarmament, an equilibrium to be kept in order to attain the creation of a world without arms and, consequently, to secure peace. Then there is another concept of equilibrium aiming at something different --

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the maintenance of the possibility for a State at any moment to settle problems through the use of armed force. The Romanian delegation, like the other Socialist delegations, supports the first concept. The second is the concept of the Western Powers, and indeed all the arguments invoked in turn by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Italy are generated by their concern to preserve what, as they see it, would secure for them superiority in the case of war, namely, nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery to targets, as well as military bases on foreign territories.

Such a concept cannot lead to disarmament, but only to new pretexts for evading disarmament. The socialist side enjoys an indisputed superiority with regard to the most powerful nuclear vehicles -- intercontinental missiles and global rockets; it is, however, ready to give up that advantage. The Western Powers consider themselves -- and I shall not discuss here whether they are right or wrong -- to be ahead as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, but they will not renounce that superiority. That is a fact and I would ask the members of this Committee to interpret that fact; it is an indisputable reality.

It has been said, "The balance will be upset to our detriment". May I ask from what point of view? As regards the level of armed forces, it is impossible; the levels of manpower possessed by the Soviet Union and by the United States will be equal. The armed forces of other States will be reduced accordingly. Will there be an imbalance from the point of view of armaments? That is impossible, since -- as we have proved on other occasions -- it is always possible to establish a certain proportion of "man to weapon" to satisfy both parties. It has been proved convincingly that imbalance with regard to the distance to be covered to the presumed theatre of operations could not exist, and that in certain respects the socialist side might even be somewhat at a disadvantage from that point of view.

Therefore there is no kind of imbalance of such a nature as to prevent the attainment of the goal of stage I, that of creating a new situation -- in the words used by the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon (ENDC/PV.60, p.16) -- an impact sufficiently heavy to make a difference. The difference we need is security, the certainty that there will be no nuclear war. The principle of balanced disarmament is meant to and must ensure the security of States. What has caused the present lack of security to which we must put an end? The existence and growth of the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

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Having listened to and having studied the statement made on Wednesday by the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, I was surprised to notice a repeated assertion of his -- namely that there is a feature common to both the Soviet plan and the United States plan, aiming at the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles. He said:

"First, it seems to us that both sides have as an ultimate objective the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles to the point where nuclear war would be no longer feasible. Secondly, both the United States and Soviet plans propose to accomplish this by a series of reductions of those armaments which contribute to a State's capacity to wage such a war." (ENDC/PV.64, p.33)

Certainly, Mr. Stelle is fully informed of the contents of the United States plan. We take account of his statement that according to that plan the aim is not to eliminate nuclear weapons and their means of delivery to targets, but only to reduce such armaments.

As far as the position of the socialist countries is concerned, it is not true to say that they aim only at the reduction -- even in stage I -- of nuclear delivery vehicles. We stand for the liquidation of all armaments, conventional armaments included. With regard to nuclear delivery vehicles, we demand their elimination in the very first stage -- and I repeat elimination, not reduction -- as a radical means of doing away with the danger of a nuclear war.

Therefore in this case we cannot speak of a common way of approaching the problem; on the contrary, a fundamental difference is manifest here. That difference is indeed fundamental, because it concerns the very goal, the very essence of the first stage of general and complete disarmament.

May I now take the liberty of referring to another question: the duration of stage II? I do so because on Wednesday the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, wished to recall again to this Committee the United States proposal on that item (ENDC/PV.64, pp.30 et seq). I should like to start by referring in this connexion to the speech made before the United States Senate by the Chairman of the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Humphrey, on 25 July 1962 -- that is, one day after the statement made by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, in this Committee (ENDC/PV.60, p.40). This is what the United States Senator Mr. Humphrey said on 25 July:

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"The problem of the time period is not so much whether the amount of armaments to be reduced in each stage could physically be reduced within the time period mentioned. Rather, it is whether the political conditions necessary for transition from one stage to another can come about within the time period specified."

Taking up further the conditions of transition from one stage to another, as provided for in the United States plan, and pointing out certain difficulties which could hinder the implementation of measures pertaining to stage I within a time period of three years, making impossible the transition to the next stage, Senator Humphrey stated:

"No one can predict how much time might then elapse before the problems created by any such difficulties could be resolved -- indeed, if they could be resolved at all. ... there are other questions which must be settled before nations could continue to reduce their armaments in an orderly, balanced and secure fashion. For instance, the United States disarmament plan states that the parties to the treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during stage I for the establishment in stage II of a United Nations peace force. Again, it might be very possible to reach the end of stage I in terms of arms reduction without at the same time having reached agreement on how a United Nations peace force is to be established. Here again the transition from stage I to stage II could be radically delayed." (Congressional Record, 25 July 1962, p.13, 756)

I hope that the representatives in this Committee will forgive me for taking up their time by reading out these quotations; however, I think that Mr. Humphrey's statements are most relevant with regard to the real reasons for which the United States proposed a period of three years for stage I, and the real reasons for submitting such nebulous language concerning the transition from one stage to another. It appears that that position is not determined -- as it is repeatedly stated to be by the United States delegation here at our Conference -- by the volume of the measures on disarmament to be implemented in stage I, but by a subjective appreciation of the United States Government of the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of certain political conditions. That we cannot accept if we wish the process of disarmament, once started, to develop rapidly and without interruption. It is absolutely necessary

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that we establish short and precise time limits, and especially that we ensure the continuity of the process of disarmament. That is the constant position of the Romanian delegation as well as of the other socialist delegations represented here.

For these reasons we fully agree with the proposal made by the representative of India, Mr. Lall (ENDC/PV.61, p.39), to include in article 4 the obligation on States to proceed without interruption to the second-stage measures of disarmament in the treaty on general and complete disarmament. We all know that the Bulgarian delegation has accepted Mr. Lall's proposal, as appears from paragraph 7 of document ENDC/L.17/Rev.1. We appeal once more to the United States delegation to revise its position on this question, to accept the proposal to implement stage I disarmament measures within a time limit of two years, and to lay down in the treaty the explicit obligation on States to proceed to the second stage immediately after the end of stage I.

The problem we are discussing is of specific importance in the process of general and complete disarmament. Certainly many delegations wish to speak on it and to make proposals. That is good. The Romanian delegation thinks that as we dealt with the previous point, and without interfering with the right of delegations to take part in the debates, it would be appropriate to invite the two co-Chairmen to take into consideration the corresponding provisions contained in the Soviet draft treaty and those found in the United States outline, as well as the proposals which have been submitted and are likely to be submitted from now on in this Committee, and to try to reach a joint text -- even if they have to use the bracket technique -- which must be submitted to us for consideration as soon as possible. Moreover, the Romanian delegation expresses the hope that this Conference will shortly receive for consideration from the two co-Chairmen a text of article 4, which has already been discussed at previous meetings. Time is pressing us.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): This morning we have heard interesting speeches from the representative of Ethiopia, whom I in my turn welcome to this Committee, and from the representatives of Burma and Romania. My delegation will study these speeches carefully when we have the verbatim record.

In my speech today I should like to refer particularly to last Wednesday's meeting, which was in my view important and constructive. It was marked by stands on fundamental positions, and by the United Kingdom delegation's submission to the Conference of two documents of the highest value for the future work of this Committee (ENDC/53 and 54).

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The Swedish delegate's speech of last Wednesday on cessation of tests (ENDC/PV.64, pp.5 et seq.) has received the closest attention of the Italian delegation. I am in full agreement with Mrs. Myrdal and with Mr. Padilla Nervo, who spoke to us last Monday about nuclear tests (ENDC/PV.63) and with Mr. Barrington, who said of this problem today (supra, p.31) that it should be kept in the front rank until we reach an agreement fulfilling our common desire and the needs of security. Mrs. Myrdal's essentially technical speech has, I think, vindicated the methods of work which the Italian delegation has always proposed and tried to promote. I hope the Committee will continue to work along these lines and will go as deeply into the technical as into the political problem.

On Wednesday we also touched on sub-paragraph 5b of our agenda (ENDC/52), with two long and detailed speeches by the Soviet Union and the United States delegations (ENDC/PV.64). The problems were put clearly in the hope of a fruitful discussion. I must observe, however, that Mr. Zorin, and Mr. Macovescu today, have not brought us anything particularly new. Mr. Zorin repeated (ENDC/PV.64, p.21), in essence, that without the total abolition of nuclear vehicles and of bases in the first stage there will be no general and complete disarmament. He further stated that the Soviet Government, in making this proposal, was simply following a suggestion of General de Gaulle. But Mr. Zorin should recall what the French representative, Mr. Jules Moch, told the Ten Nation Committee on this subject on 15 June 1960 (TNCD/PV.39, pp.4 et seq.). All the delegations here can re-read the verbatim record of these statements and see for themselves that the French position was substantially different from the Soviet delegation's account of it.

France never in fact contemplated abolishing the bases at the same time as the vehicles, for which incidentally it advocated first control and then reduction by stages. Mr. Moch, indeed, considered the total abolition of vehicles in the first stage impossible and impracticable. It is also true, however, that until June 1960 the Soviet Government never demanded the total abolition of vehicles and bases in the first stage as a condition precedent to general and complete disarmament. That was the first time it took this position, and since then the Soviet delegation's attitude to the new condition has been consistently rigid and intransigent.

In any case I do not wish to repeat today the general remarks my delegation has made on articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Soviet draft (ENDC/2). I would rather follow the method of work suggested by the United Kingdom delegation (ENDC/50), and draw the Committee's attention to one definite point in the Soviet proposals: nuclear artillery, the subject of article 8.

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Speaking generally of nuclear vehicles, Mr. Stelle mentioned (ENDC/PV.64, p.34) a "twilight zone", a "zone of uncertainty". The problems raised by this uncertainty strike us particularly clearly if we examine article 8 of the Soviet draft. Article 8 starts by proposing the elimination of all artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivery for nuclear weapons. That is clear, and seems at first sight easy enough. In reality it is nothing of the kind. To apply such a measure, one would first have to define the artillery now capable of serving as means of delivery for nuclear weapons, and to distinguish it from all conventional artillery. This definition is very difficult and, as things are, almost impossible. It is not enough to show good will. It is not necessary to be an expert to know that much of the artillery with which troops are equipped today can be used either with conventional ammunition or with nuclear warheads.

From this it follows that, if the first provision of article 8 were carried out, the forces still under arms would lose a very large part of their fire-power. This might be conceivable, and even desirable, at an advanced stage of general and complete disarmament. But we know that the measures in article 8 are to be carried out at the start: that is to say, before any adequate international force is in being or mutual confidence has been restored.

Thus the Western Powers in Europe would be deprived at the start of the artillery they would need to defend themselves against the "superiority" in tanks and armoured cars of the Eastern armies spoken of by Mr. Burns. Once again, the balance necessary for disarmament would not be kept. This would be equivalent, perhaps, to doing away with the stages of disarmament in regard not only to vehicles but also to conventional weapons -- to carrying out total disarmament in one swoop within a very short period. Is that realistic? Does it accord with the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5)?

Furthermore, a special system would be necessary, to supervise continuously the application of these measures. It is well known that the nuclear Powers are working at present on technical methods of "miniaturizing" nuclear devices. But under the Soviet plan nuclear devices would be left intact during the first stage. The process of "miniaturization" would therefore proceed and progress, so that light weapons with which -- as non-nuclear weapons -- forces would still be equipped might at some stage, owing to new discoveries, become capable of delivering small nuclear projectiles as dangerous and destructive as large bombs. The international

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disarmament organization would therefore have to apply continuously a very complicated system of control, for obviously a "break-through" in "miniaturization" would give an immense advantage to the Power which first achieved it, and would completely upset the balance of the disarmament process.

Let us now take the second sentence of article 8, paragraph 1:

"All subsidiary instruments and technical facilities designed for controlling the fire of such artillery systems shall be destroyed."

~ (ENDC/2, p.7).

Here, too, we have insurmountable difficulties. Here too it is not necessary to be an expert to understand that it is excessively difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish subsidiary instruments and technical facilities -- I imagine that this refers to dial-sights, range-finders, and the like -- designed for the delivery of nuclear projectiles, from those designed for the delivery of conventional projectiles.

I think the same difficulty exists for the third sentence of article 8, paragraph 1:

"Surface storage places and transport facilities for such systems shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses." (ibid.)

I should like the Soviet delegation to explain to us how one can distinguish storage places and transport facilities designed for nuclear artillery systems from those designed for conventional artillery, and to tell us what criteria might be applied.

The fourth sentence of article 8, paragraph 1, concerning the destruction of non-nuclear munitions, seems to me only to confirm what I said a little while ago: that article 8 was aimed at depriving the remaining forces of much conventional artillery support, so that the power of the Soviet Army tanks and armoured vehicles would be strengthened and thus become decisive.

I shall not dwell on article 8, paragraph 2, which concerns production. All the uncertainties and difficulties which I have pointed out in the first paragraph are equally relevant, so that paragraph 2 is just as inapplicable as paragraph 1.

Article 8, paragraph 3 is astonishingly simple. I will even say that it remains an enigma. It says:

"Inspectors of the international disarmament organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to above in paragraphs 1 and 2." (ibid.)

None of the requests for explanation addressed to the Soviet delegation during the first part of this session brought us any clarity. I will try, however, to interpret what the Soviet delegation has said on this subject and to deduce the consequences.

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The Soviet delegation, as you know, has assured us that the proposed total elimination of nuclear vehicles in the first stage would be subject to 100 per cent control, which I imagine means total; but it has given us no details. Logically, to understand the kind of total control over elimination of vehicles of which the Soviet delegation speaks, one should interpret the wording of the Soviet draft treaty by the process of construction ordinarily applied to legal texts. Article 38 of the Soviet treaty may help us, and I will quote part of it:

"... the international disarmament organization shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty.

"The international disarmament organization shall have the right to institute a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over the territories of the States parties to the Treaty." (ibid., p.24).

This article in fact defines clearly what total control means for the purposes of the Soviet draft. According to the Soviet delegation's statements, this type of control is to be applied during the first stage to the limited sector of vehicles and particularly to the nuclear artillery of which we are speaking. But I do not see how one could be sure that there is no longer any nuclear artillery in the equipment of armies without inspecting, in the first stage, all remaining conventional forces to ensure that no weapon capable of a twofold use has been retained or hidden.

Article 8, paragraph 3, concerning control applies not only to the first measure in paragraph 1, but also to all the measures in article 8 affecting subsidiary instruments, munitions stocks, production of munitions, and the rest.

The international disarmament organization would therefore have to keep constant watch on all subsidiary instruments, all storage depots and all factories, wherever situated, and at the same time look out for possible progress in miniaturization. But if control, to be 100 per cent, must be so far-reaching, what becomes of the Soviet principle "Beware of espionage"? We have accepted the Soviet principle "So much disarmament, so much control" in our control proposals, including the zonal control system. Now the Soviet Union is illogically failing to respect its own draft treaty. I really think that in article 8 the Soviet proposals not only lack realism but are also opposed to the logical pattern of the

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Soviet draft itself. The alternative is that on this question of control we are confronted by a monstrous quibble, and this 100 per cent control, this total control which the Soviet delegation has so often expounded, is a mere verbal disguise for a repetition of the old, unacceptable form of control which deprives inspection of any substantial safeguards.

To conclude and sum up, I should like to put the following questions to the Soviet delegation:

- (a) How would one distinguish in these days between conventional artillery and nuclear artillery?
- (b) How could one ensure in the future that progress in the "miniaturization" of nuclear devices would not modify the criteria for (a)?
- (c) How would one distinguish the subsidiary instruments and depots intended for conventional use from those serving nuclear artillery?
- (d) By what form of inspection could one ascertain that the agreed forces remaining under the Treaty were not equipped with "convertible" artillery capable of delivering nuclear projectiles?
- (e) By what form of inspection could one obtain similar assurance in relation to subsidiary instruments, storage places, means of transport, and artillery plants?

These are the questions which I should like to put to the Soviet delegation in clarification of article 8.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): We must all agree that we have entered a very interesting stage of discussion in this Committee. From general considerations we have passed to specific and concrete issues, and I must say that I have listened with very great interest and attention to the speeches delivered during this meeting and the previous one. This applies to the very learned and very well documented speech made by Mrs. Myrdal on 1 August (ENDC/PV.64, pp. 5 et seq.) concerning the most urgent of the issues confronting us, the issue of the cessation of nuclear tests. Now we have before us one of the first steps which we think ought to be taken within the framework of the first stage of the disarmament

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process. Representatives of the Western alliance have advanced many reasons which, as they indicated, make this proposal unacceptable to them. They have reverted to the question of balance, invoked difficulties of control, and called the proposal "sadly unrealistic". All shades and colours of criticism were put forward. That has been done again this morning by the representative of Italy.

I would suggest that each one of the criticisms, if it were valid, would suffice; but as there are so many of them it makes them doubtful, and I question their validity. If the case were in court the judge would undoubtedly say, "Give me one argument, but a good one. I do not need any others." That reminds me of a story about Napoleon -- but do not fear; I am not making any historical analogy. When he was visiting a town and the host failed to give him the honour due to him, the salute of guns, the host explained that there were ten reasons for not doing so, and started to enumerate them. The first one was that he had no shells. He was stopped by the Emperor, who said that there was no need to enumerate any other reasons. The point is to have this "shell" in the positive sense.

I think we shall still have an opportunity to discuss these issues in detail; but there was one point which struck me very much and to which I would like to draw attention this morning. I beg the Committee's indulgence while I do so. The representative of the United States, while discussing nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and those which have only a conventional capacity suggested at our meeting on 1 August that it was highly unlikely that an objective definition of those two classes of weapon systems could be arrived at, and he said at the end of his statement:

"... we believe there are no verbal distinctions between classes of armaments -- nuclear and conventional -- which can serve as a basis for arriving at agreed treaty language." (ENDC/PV.64, p. 39).

Those phrases, concluding as they did a certain line of reasoning, were highly disappointing to me. I would say more: they worried me. I shall explain why, for they are by and large the expression of a trend towards assimilation of conventional and nuclear weapons.

Let me look at this issue a little more closely. Is it not true that since humanity commenced its attempts to alleviate the sufferings of war, its evils and its wrongs, a distinction has always been made between different types of weapons -- those which were more harmful and those which were called "conventional"? "The

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right of the belligerent to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited". That is what article 22 of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 made clear. These issues were dealt with by the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 prohibiting the use of certain projectiles which were either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances. The Hague Declaration of 1899 dealt with expanding bullets. Poison and poisoned weapons were explicitly prohibited by article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations of both 1899 and 1907. We know that poisoned weapons were prohibited long ago in ancient India. Need I cite to this Committee the prohibitions of 1899 of the use of projectiles the sole purpose of which was the diffusion of deleterious and asphyxiating gases; or the Geneva Protocol of 1925 extending the ban to analogous liquids, materials or devices, and bacteriological methods of warfare?

What was the guiding principle of all these documents? To separate certain types of weapons; to distinguish from other weapons those weapons which were more harmful, more dangerous and more destructive and which caused unnecessary suffering. They showed evidence of a certain progressive trend aimed at banning, or prohibiting, those weapons which unnecessarily caused mankind harm and injury. They did so by mentioning the media by which those weapons could be used, or limiting themselves to their enumeration. But what was essential? The weapon was decisive. The criterion was not the vehicle or the medium, and that is the essential issue -- the weapon and its reprehensible character was decisive.

The list of those weapons, as we all know, has now been enriched by one which is more dangerous, more destructive and more harmful than any other weapon that we have known in history. Everybody knows that, basing oneself on this very criterion, one cannot consider the nuclear weapon a conventional weapon in the sense in which we are accustomed to use that term. No one will deny its harmful character which bars it, and will continue to bar it, from entry into what we may call the family of conventional weapons. Any attempt in that direction would amount to a step backwards even in relation to that highly inadequate progress -- and we agree that it was inadequate progress -- which was made at the beginning of the nineteenth century concerning those particular types of weapon; the more so since, here and now, we are committed to work out an instrument not only for prohibiting the use of weapons but for making war physically impossible by barring all preparatory measures which may lead towards it.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

That being so, it seems only logical and obvious that we ought to begin with those most dangerous weapons. We could, of course, and we should prohibit them, destroy them. In the circumstances -- and in this we are realistic -- it looks as if, in the first stage of the envisaged disarmament process, such prohibition and destruction were highly unlikely. Therefore it has been suggested that, as a first stage, we should eliminate the media and the instruments which serve arms of mass annihilation. We accepted that proposal, which was set forth clearly by France. The fact that Mr. Moch interpreted it in a different way, as Mr. Cavalletti pointed out this morning (supra, p. 27), does not affect the proposal. A child may be much better looked after by those who adopt him than by his natural parents; hence the institution of adoption; as in family law, so in other spheres. I regret that Mr. Cavalletti condones the desertion by France of its own child.

Why have we adopted the proposal? We have adopted it because we think that it is justified by three mutually-dependent phenomena: the distance covered by atomic weapons, their speed, and their striking power. This special treatment accorded to nuclear weapons which is called for results from the very fact -- which existed at the time when atomic weapons were invented -- that they cannot be dosed. The extent of the damage caused by them cannot be strictly defined or measured. I believe that it was Harold Urey who said as early as 1945: "Atomic bombs do not land in the next block, leaving survivors to thank their lucky stars and to hope that the next bomb also will miss them." That is the essential difference. The possibility of calculating the extent of the damage caused by nuclear weapons is highly problematic. I submit that it almost escapes the frontiers of our reasoning. How can we then even attempt to compare, or even less to assimilate, atomic weapons and nuclear weapons with conventional weapons? That is why, as I said earlier, we think -- and we feel that we are right in so thinking -- that a different approach is necessary, an approach adequate to the potentiality of this most dangerous and destructive weapon.

But at the same time we are witnessing the process of dividing nuclear weapons into strategic types and tactical types. Mr. Stelle, the representative of the United States, suggested in his speech at our last meeting that, given the nature of modern technology, there is nothing to prevent the development of a shell that will be used in a smaller calibre gun (ENDC/PV.64, p.35). We may then, before long, approach a situation in which the rounds of atomic ammunition will be counted as they were counted in the past, following the statistics, say, of the Civil War in the

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

United States, 5 million rounds, or of the first year of the First World War, when France expended 81 million rounds of ammunition. The prospects are very gloomy in that respect. But I submit that, whatever its size, whether it is strategic or tactical, and whether we call it a nuclear device in a conventional weapon or otherwise, a nuclear weapon remains outside the family of conventional weapons by its very nature, by its quality, by the effects which it produces being different in kind; and no attempt to define them differently could change the actual situation. But the trend itself is particularly dangerous. It may lead to the further dissemination of these abhorrent means of warfare.

These small and tactical atomic weapons, as they are called, are closely linked with another philosophy which we have been reading about recently, the philosophy of limited or local wars in which military operations, it is suggested, may be limited and nuclear weapons used only within a defined area. No one but Edward Teller has expounded the idea that "we could limit the aims of war and also the territory in which the fighting would take place". But at the same time even he had to concede that "the means of war cannot be limited". There, I submit, is the very crux of the problem, which discloses the fallacy of that reasoning. By being unable to limit the means of war one destroys the possibility of fighting a limited war; one destroys the possibility of drawing frontiers for war or delimiting the area of destruction. Mr. Teller himself, as I quoted him, made it clear that "in case of war we shall use the most effective weapons available". That destroys the whole argument and philosophy of limited wars. It has been eloquently stated also by a United States authority on the subject who argued convincingly that a war can only be regarded as limited "where one side deliberately withholds use of existing strategic weapons of the greatest destructive capacity for the purpose of inducing the other side similarly to refrain from their use". "But", he added, "failure to exercise that restraint would lead to just the thermonuclear holocaust which each nation is seeking desperately to avoid".

Thus the crucial question remains to be answered: "How to achieve it?" Once nuclear weapons are brought into play, big or small, strategic or tactical, mass annihilation is inevitable. That is why I submit that the whole philosophy of what are called limited wars is so dangerous and is in fact a contradiction in terms, in particular in Europe --- and it is the European theatre with which we have been concerned in our recent discussions dealing with the strategic aspects of the first stage of disarmament.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

Here are some of the considerations which I submit should and must be borne in mind when discussing the problem of disarmament and, in the first place, nuclear disarmament. Since, as I said earlier, the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons has crossed the boundary of what could be called relative calculation of probability, nothing short of its elimination would do, and therefore we have to immobilize those weapons. How to do it? It is suggested: by abolishing and destroying the media for their use. And that, I believe, is a constructive compromise proposal.

It has been said that there exists a vast "twilight zone" (ENDC/PV.64, p.34) within which the weapon systems of a dual capacity are placed. That may be so; but those armaments designed to serve both types of weapons should be dealt with from the point of view of their ability to deliver those weapons which are most dangerous, because their capacity is the decisive criterion. The vehicle itself is an instrument of the weapon and serves it, and not vice versa. So the criterion — the decisive criterion — is the character of the weapon.

Therefore, in spite of the long list of points advanced against the use of this first step leading to general and complete disarmament, I fail to find any valid reason for rejecting it. I fail to agree with the tendency to assimilate nuclear and conventional weapons, even via vehicles — not directly but via vehicles. That distinction must be kept and must find its reflection in our disarmament document.

But what has this discussion shown? It has shown how important it is to reach agreement on the subject as quickly as possible, for the longer we wait the greater the danger of the atomic weapon's descending to the very bottom of the ladder of armaments and becoming, not conventional — because I would bar even the use of the word in this connexion — but part and parcel of the armament of every unit; and the greater will be the temptation to assimilate it with other armaments, a process which all of us must deplore because it may ultimately lead to an attempt to legalize atomic weapons. That would be the logical conclusion.

How then can we avert that process, which is dangerous, which is imminent, and which we have to face? According to the United States proposal, the production of these weapons will go on — and production means perfecting — which implies, or may imply, their further dissemination. Thus the alternative to the method we suggest will generate consequences which will in fact defeat its objectives; we shall thus have a two-stage process, defeating the ends of the very document which we are going to prepare — further perfection of these weapons, further attempts at assimilating atomic and conventional weapons.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

I think that we should draw from this the proper conclusions: we must take measures which would make it impossible to use nuclear weapons, as the most dangerous and the most destructive. Their special treatment within the framework of disarmament measures to be adopted is justified for the many reasons I have advanced. Without it we shall not take any decisive step in the right direction. War will still remain possible and, to borrow the phrase of an authority on the subject, we shall still be flirting with atomic war in this atomic age.

Could we not, instead of arguing on categories of war, transfer the logic of our reasoning into the realm of peace, and thus try to advance our negotiations? Not discuss armaments regulation or partial disarmament, for, as was so rightly pointed out by our colleague from Ethiopia, those things would not suffice. Nor would it suffice, to borrow another phrase from an old disarmament project, to have an "armaments holiday". I think we must really make a supreme effort of negotiation and try to combine our proposals to create a situation which would fulfil two conditions -- no return to war, and no alternative to peace.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all I should like to say that we have listened with great interest and attention to the statement made by the representative of Ethiopia, a country which took a great and noble step in the United Nations by raising the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, a step which was supported by the Soviet Union and by all peace-loving States, and approved by the General Assembly. We shall of course carefully study the important views he put forward on general and complete disarmament.

We have also listened carefully to the statement made by the representative of Burma, who spoke on the urgent question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We fully understand his concern at the deadlock in this matter, but we hope we shall be able to take up this question again for serious consideration next week.

Apart from other important aspects, the statement made by the representative of Romania drew our attention to an extremely important question which was touched upon in our last discussion and dealt with in a particularly graphic manner by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and again this morning by the representative of Italy, namely the question of distinguishing between nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and conventional weapons.

(Mr. Zarin, USSR)

The representative of Romania drew attention to the Agreed Principles for disarmament (ENDC/5), in which the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in general are distinctly singled out from other types of weapons. I believe that the representative of the United States cannot deny that during our lengthy negotiations with the United States, in which fully qualified and authorized representatives from the United States side took part, this question was settled in the most carefully considered manner. We therefore cannot understand why the United States representatives now wish to lump nuclear weapons delivery vehicles with conventional armaments, and why they now raise the point that we cannot distinguish between delivery vehicles and conventional armaments. This is utterly incomprehensible and unquestionably contrary to point 3 of the Agreed Principles, where the means of delivery of nuclear weapons are singled out as an independent type of weapon which must be eliminated in the process of general and complete disarmament. It seems to me that this lumping together of types of weapons which is now persistently being emphasized by the representative of the United States undoubtedly has a close connexion politically with those concepts which the representative of Poland spoke about today in great detail and so convincingly.

It is precisely the attempt and tendency to treat nuclear weapons and all means for their delivery as conventional armaments, and to treat nuclear warfare as conventional warfare which can be resorted to in both local and general conflicts, which was expressed in the specific proposals included in the United States plan, where we find, lumped together, both the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and conventional armaments.

Our position is different and is quite clearly stated in our plan. Contrary to what the representative of Italy said, we do not regard this as a weak point of our plan but, on the contrary, as its great merit. We consider that the singling out of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons is the direct consequence of compliance with the Agreed Principles which were subscribed to both by the United States and ourselves. We can only express our surprise that the United States should depart from these Agreed Principles.

I should now like to pass on to certain matters touched upon at our last meeting, especially in the statements of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. I should like to make four observations on these statements.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

First, in our statement at the plenary meeting of the Committee on 1 August (ENDC/PV.64, pp.20 et seq.) we showed that the difference between our proposals for the elimination of all delivery vehicles in the first stage and the United States proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of them in the first stage is a profound difference of principle. Our proposals on means of delivery prescribed the implementation in stage I of radical measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear attack, and are consequently aimed at real disarmament and the strengthening of peace.

The United States proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of delivery vehicles in stage I is aimed, as we have pointed out, not at the speediest elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war, but at maintaining this threat indefinitely. It is also designed to help the Western Powers to obtain unilateral military advantages to the detriment of the security of the Soviet Union and the other socialist States.

We have emphasized that a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in stage I, combined moreover with the maintenance, untouched, of all United States military bases on alien territory and with selective zonal control, could be used by certain circles in the West to ensure by the end of stage I a change in the balance of forces in their favour and, having halted the disarmament process, to embark on a military venture.

Consequently the proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I, though disguised as a disarmament measure, may in fact become an instrument for the military policies of certain aggressive circles. Precisely therein lies the difference of principle between the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States on the disarmament measures relating to the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I.

The future attitude of the Western Powers to the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I will be, as it were, the acid test which will show whether the Western Powers really do or do not desire to reach agreement on the main disarmament problems.

Secondly, the Western Powers are trying very hard to slur over and cover up precisely this difference of principle. The statements of the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, and the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, at the plenary meeting of our Committee on 1 August (ENDC/PV.64) were designed from beginning to end to serve precisely this purpose. Both Mr. Stelle and Mr. Godber tried very hard to create the impression that, in this matter of delivery vehicles,

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

the differences between our positions are not differences of principle and that they affect, not the objective of eliminating all delivery vehicles, but merely the method, merely the question of how to carry out this elimination, in what order and in what sequence.

For instance, Mr. Stelle said:

"First, it seems to us that both sides have as an ultimate objective the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles to the point where nuclear war would be no longer feasible". (ENDC/PV.64, p.33)

Further, Mr. Stelle said:

"Indeed, both the United States and the Soviet Union, in their proposals for the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, will inevitably, in one or more stages, pass through the same levels of such armaments ...." (ibid).

Mr. Stelle then went on to say:

".... and while there is a difference over the timing, or the pace at which this reduction should proceed, there is no apparent difference with regard to the principle." (ibid).

Mr. Godber used even more expressive phraseology in this connexion. He said:

"... the Western delegations, as I think has been made quite clear many times, are as conscious as anybody of the need to eliminate nuclear delivery vehicles. We want to get rid of them just as much as anyone else". (ibid, p.41)

Consequently there is a desire to depict the difference of principle in regard to objectives, in regard to the actual approach to the disarmament problem, as a mere difference in the methods of achieving a common objective.

The fact that Mr. Stelle has raised a number of completely artificial questions, and his rhetorical ingenuity displayed in the expression "twilight zones", are obviously intended to deflect the Committee away from discussion of the substance of the disarmament programme in the first stage, of the substance of the United States position on the elimination of all delivery vehicles, as the most important element in the solution of the problem of eliminating the threat of nuclear war at the very beginning of disarmament.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Since, however, Mr. Stelle has asked us to give him clarification on a number of points, saying that without it the United States delegation would find it difficult to formulate a definitive position on the problem under discussion, we are prepared to give some explanations, in the preparation of which we have availed ourselves of the assistance of the military adviser to our delegation.

In the first place, we deem it necessary to state quite definitely that in the entire range of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons there are no twilight zones. All delivery vehicles can be divided into only two categories, namely means of delivery specially constructed to carry nuclear warheads, and means of delivery constructed in such a way that they can carry either a nuclear or a conventional warhead; that is, dual-purpose weapons.

With regard to the first category, Mr. Stelle, it appears, has no doubt that it must be included entirely under the heading of nuclear weapon vehicles. For some reason he has doubts about the second category. However, such doubts are absolutely without any foundation. All means of delivery of so-called dual-purpose weapons must unhesitatingly be included among nuclear delivery vehicles and not conventional armaments. To do otherwise would mean acting not only absurdly from the point of view of logic, but also in a dangerous direction from the point of view of the substance of the question, because this would mean leaving untouched delivery vehicles which could be used at any moment for a nuclear attack. That is all that needs to be said about the first "twilight zone". There is simply no such zone.

Further, Mr. Stelle puts forward the idea that it is possible to use some types of conventional weapons after they have been specially adapted, or even some means of transport such as ships and civil aircraft, for delivering nuclear weapons to their targets. That is his second "twilight zone". But here again everything is clear. If there is to be any talk about its being possible, as a result of technological progress, to convert any type of conventional armament into a nuclear vehicle, this merely confirms our demand -- and it is not only ours -- that general and complete disarmament should be implemented within strictly defined time-limits. Of course, if the disarmament programme is extended over one generation -- or even over several generations --, during that time it will perhaps be possible to construct even a pistol cartridge with a nuclear warhead. But if the disarmament programme is carried out in a short period, say four or five years, and if the first stage of disarmament is implemented within two years, such a danger will obviously not arise.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

It is well known that today even among artillery and mortar systems few could use nuclear ammunition. The great majority of these systems, whatever their purpose and wherever they may be established, are not adapted, and cannot be adapted, so to speak, by rough and ready methods, for firing nuclear shells. So this argument of Mr. Stelle's is simply irrelevant. The same may be said of ships as a means of delivery. What is a ship as a means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets? It is essentially a mobile base for rockets and torpedoes with nuclear warheads, or for aircraft carrying nuclear bombs. Therefore if rockets, torpedoes and aircraft capable of carrying nuclear warheads or nuclear bombs are destroyed, there would be no ships carrying rockets, torpedoes or aircraft. All that will remain will be the ships' hulls. But we propose to destroy also the hulls of all submarines and large surface warships. There will only remain small naval vessels, unsuitable for use as a base for rockets, torpedoes or aircraft, which will, moreover, themselves be destroyed, and mercantile marine ships, including ships of large tonnage. But can these be used for delivering nuclear warheads to their targets? No. Neither from a fishing craft nor from an ocean liner can nuclear bombs or nuclear warheads be launched; there will simply be nothing to launch them with. A nuclear warhead is not a weight which the talented American sportsman Long or the well-known British blacksmith Rowe can throw to a distance of 19 - 20 metres.

Now I should like to say a few words on civil aircraft, which, according to Mr. Stelle, could be used as a means of delivering nuclear weapons. Of course it is possible to drop a nuclear bomb from the porthole of a Boeing 707 or a TU-114, even when there is no special bomb-dropping or aiming equipment on board. But in that case the bomb would have to be dropped from an insufficient height at a relatively slow speed and with very little accuracy. It was precisely in view of this possibility, albeit a very unlikely one, that the Soviet Government expressed the opinion that in order to ensure the complete security of States it might be advisable to retain for a certain period of time the means of anti-aircraft defence such as fighter planes, anti-aircraft rockets, and anti-aircraft guns.

Obviously we are speaking of fighter planes, anti-aircraft rockets and AA guns which could not themselves be used as a means of delivering nuclear weapons. The armed forces of every State include types of fighters, anti-aircraft rockets and AA guns which, owing to the peculiarities of their construction, are unsuitable

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for carrying nuclear weapons. Everyone knows that. While they are unsuitable for use as a means of delivering nuclear weapons, they are quite reliable and effective as a means of defence against a relatively weak air opponent such as civilian aircraft.

That is the situation with regard to Mr. Stelle's second "twilight zone".

When the question raised by Mr. Stelle is approached on a factual basis, there turns out to be no real problem at all. In any case there are no complications. But Mr. Stelle proposes that we should engage in a thorough study of this question, spend time on it and concentrate the work of the Committee on it. Why should that be necessary? Obviously it can only be needed for the purpose of confusing the issue and covering up the real differences of principle between our two positions on means of delivery.

Now for my third point. Mr. Godber presented two working papers entitled "Preliminary Study of Problems Connected with the Elimination of Rockets as Nuclear Delivery Vehicles" (ENDC/53) and "Preliminary Study of Problems Connected with the Verification of the Destruction of Certain Nuclear Delivery Vehicles" (ENDC/54). The Soviet delegation does not deem it possible to disregard any documents and materials submitted by other delegations for consideration by the Committee. That is why we have carefully studied the documents submitted by Mr. Godber. After studying them, we asked ourselves the following question: what is there, in fact, that we could study in depth on the basis of these two documents, and what purpose would such a study serve at this stage of our negotiations?

First of all we discovered in these United Kingdom working documents whole pages of apparently scientific text containing completely self-evident things which do not require any discussion. For instance, paragraph 12 on page 4 of document ENDC/53 expounds in detail the reasons for the necessity of verifying by inspection the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. But does anyone object to this? Of course nobody does. Then why do you propose that we should have a thorough discussion? What sense is there in such a discussion?

Paragraph 13 of the same document states that it would be difficult to disguise the manufacture of the body of a rocket or conceal the final assembly, should anyone wish to violate clandestinely the provisions of a treaty for the cessation of the manufacture of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. This is perfectly obvious. We have always based ourselves on this standpoint. There is no argument, no lack of clarity in this regard.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

These documents contain other self-evident statements, but in order to save time I shall not deal with them.

Why, then, with the learned look of professors from the island of Laputa so vividly described by the great satirist Jonathan Swift, do you put forward these self-evident truths and propose that we should make a thorough study of them? One can hardly imagine that this has any other purpose than to divert the Committee's attention from the basic questions of principle and from businesslike work in reaching agreement on a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament and the appropriate articles of that treaty.

Furthermore, in these United Kingdom documents a number of completely artificial questions are raised: for instance, that of distinguishing between military rockets and rockets designed for the exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes. Paragraph 5 of the first United Kingdom document even states that this is "one of the main difficulties with which we have to contend, in attempting to eliminate rockets as nuclear delivery vehicles". But how can there be any difficulty, when it is common knowledge and has been repeatedly stated by the specialists and political leaders of both sides that there is simply no difference between military and peaceful rockets as carriers of a certain payload? It is impossible to make a distinction where none exists, and in fact there is no need to do so. The question simply does not arise.

Moreover, we should not forget that the Soviet Union proposes to destroy all -- I repeat literally all -- rockets except a strictly limited number which would be transferred for peaceful purposes, and all such rockets would be under the supervision of inspectors from the international disarmament organization. You can find the appropriate provisions in this respect in article 5 of our draft treaty. That is one of the articles which is now being considered by the Committee.

If, on the other hand, it is feared that in some way or other such rockets will be fitted with nuclear warheads, here again our draft treaty contains special provisions designed to prevent scientific rockets from being converted into a means of carrying out a nuclear attack. Take article 15 of our draft treaty, where you will see the following:

- "1. The launching of rockets and space devices shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.

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"2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article through the establishment of inspection teams at the sites for peaceful rocket launchings who shall be present at the launchings and shall thoroughly examine every rocket or satellite before their launching."

(ENDC/2, p.12)

We cannot help wondering whether our draft treaty has been read by those who drafted these United Kingdom documents and proposed that we should make a thorough study of the differences between "military" and "peaceful" rockets, or of what is stated in paragraph 17(d) of the first United Kingdom document:

"Is there any way of ensuring against the aggressive misuse of future developments in space, apart from bringing all launchings under international control?" (ENDC/53, p.6)

You could raise an infinite number of such questions; but there is no point in studying them, since they are questions which have already been settled and do not need to be studied. But the fact that they are nevertheless raised by the delegation of the United Kingdom confirms once again the conclusion that it is obviously pursuing a very definite purpose: to prevent our Committee from concentrating its attention on the main question, the necessity of completely eliminating all means of delivering nuclear weapons in stage I, which is what the Western Powers are opposing.

It would hardly be objective if we did not mention that the United Kingdom documents not only contain self-evident statements and raise artificial questions, but also contain some things which, generally speaking, might eventually be turned to account. Thus in paragraph 11 of the first document and in several paragraphs of the second document we find a detailed study of two possible methods of destroying rockets, either by firing them, let us say, into the ocean without warheads, or by destroying them on the spot. These paragraphs may be of use when we discuss not whether we should destroy all rockets, which is the problem before us now, but what technical means are to be used to destroy these rockets. We also consider that serious attention should be given to the propositions in paragraph 4 of the second United Kingdom document which suggests how it might be possible to facilitate the task of supervising the destruction of rockets without making the inspection any less reliable.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Interesting calculations can be found in paragraph 12 of the second United Kingdom document, where we see that in order to destroy roughly 500 military aircraft in a year it would be sufficient to have about fifty engineers and workmen. That is true. It is easier to destroy than to build. We have constantly said the same thing, and have stressed the fact that no special technical difficulties should arise or will arise in implementing the programme of general and complete disarmament, and in particular in eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, if we approach these questions seriously and with a desire to solve them. We note, incidentally, that these propositions in the second United Kingdom document are a good illustration of the fact that it is not a matter of technical difficulties but of a political divergency of views on whether all means of delivery of nuclear weapons should be destroyed. Here Mr. Godber seems to be answering Mr. Stelle, who always points to these technical difficulties, and in this instance we are in full agreement with Mr. Godber.

Anyway, it is perfectly clear that even those propositions of the United Kingdom document which might prove useful when it comes to drafting, let us say, some addenda to an agreed treaty cannot possibly be a subject for serious study at the present stage of our work. What is in fact the use of discussing whether fifty, or thirty, or seventy engineers and workmen would be required to destroy 500 aircraft in a year before there is any agreement that all such aircraft should be destroyed in stage I? In the light of all this we have an ever stronger impression that the United Kingdom documents have been submitted, not in order to facilitate the task of the Committee and to advance our work, but to divert it.

This is confirmed, incidentally, by the fact that even in those paragraphs of the United Kingdom documents containing propositions which might eventually be useful, we find -- I hope the sponsors of these documents will excuse me -- complete absurdities, the study of which by the Committee would lead to our marking time as in the dance called "The Twist", which is so now fashionable in the West. How can we say anything else, for instance, about the proposition in paragraph 13 of the second United Kingdom document which reads:

"As for ballistic missiles, the international staff would need clerical support and guards to protect records." (ENDC/54, p.4)

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

It is hard to believe that that sort of thing could be intended seriously. We should like to tell Mr. Godber, who has promised to submit other similar documents for our attention in future: "It is not worth it, Mr. Godber; it will not be any use, either to us or to you."

Fourthly, in case anybody still has any doubts about the purposes for which the representatives of the Western Powers are trying to impose upon the Committee the study of all these artificial questions, and why they are trying to divert the discussions in the Committee into the channel of technical details, one of Mr. Stelle's statements at our meeting on 1 August will settle the last of those doubts. Speaking on how to distinguish nuclear weapon delivery vehicles from conventional armaments, Mr. Stelle said:

"Even given reasonable answers to the question which we have cited above, and to the many analogous questions which those answers themselves may raise, it appears to us that it will still be impossible to reach an agreement on the basis of Soviet proposals which would meet the legitimate concerns of all parties". (ENDC/PV.64, p.37)

So they ask us to give explanations of our proposals; they put to us many detailed questions -- as Mr. Cavalletti did today in support of his ally --; they call upon us to make a thorough study of these questions; they prepare new questions arising out of our answers; and at the end of it all they declare that in any event our proposals for the complete elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons will not be accepted by the Western Powers. Why, then, do they ask all these questions? What, then, is the reason for all this detailed study? Its only purpose is to hamper the work of our Committee and to minimize the impression that is bound to be made on every reasonable person by the Western Powers' refusal to eliminate the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage, or even to single out this dangerous type of weapon from the whole range of other types of weapons.

When, however, the representatives of the Western Powers come to say that they do not accept our proposals on this question, they find themselves completely without any argument on which to base their opposition. They grasp desperately at one and the same thesis about the so-called upsetting of balance as a result of implementing the Soviet proposals. At recent meetings of the Committee we have shown with facts and figures the real value of this talk about upsetting the balance.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

We have shown that there are no serious grounds at all for the arguments advanced, and neither Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada, who is the best qualified to deal with military problems, nor any other representatives of the Western Powers, could find anything to say that would refute our statements.

Progress in our task of agreeing on articles concerning the means of delivery of nuclear weapons can be achieved, not by studying the number of guards needed to protect records, but by studying in a serious and constructive way the question of the complete elimination of these delivery vehicles in the first stage. Such constructive discussion will be possible only if the Western Powers abandon their uncompromising attitude on this issue, an attitude which has no bearing at all on disarmament, and take the path towards mutually-acceptable decisions. During the few weeks since the Committee resumed its work the Soviet Union has gone out to meet the Western Powers on a number of questions. I shall not enumerate them, because everyone knows what they are. We are waiting, the whole world is waiting, for corresponding moves by the Western Powers. Without such corresponding moves our work will certainly not make any progress.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): In view of the lateness of the hour I will confine myself to some brief comments on what has been said here this morning by previous speakers. The United States delegation will study with great care the statements that have been made here today by the representative of Ethiopia, whom we too welcome to our midst, the representative of Burma, and our friend and ally the representative of Italy. We will, of course, also study and perhaps comment upon in due course the statements made by the other speakers this morning. For the moment I should like to make only three brief comments.

Mr. Lachs claimed that the Soviet Union and its Eastern allies had adopted a French idea (supra p.34), and he lauded the principle of adoption. Adoption is certainly a very fine thing, provided however you do not disfigure the child in the process. As Mr. Cavalletti pointed out this morning (supra p.27), in the Ten Nation Committee Mr. Moch made it clear that his interpretation of the French proposal was for a gradual, methodical and progressive elimination, through stages, of means of delivery of nuclear weapons; and in the statement which Mr. Cavalletti quoted Mr. Moch concluded by saying:

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

"It is because we wish to go far -- to go right to the end -- in carrying out an idea, originally French, which aims at delivering the world from the anguish of the nuclear threat, that we urge our Eastern colleagues not to make a sound and fruitful idea impossible to put into effect." (TNCD/PV.39, p.11)

Both Mr. Macovescu and Mr. Zorin referred to the mention of the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles worked out by Mr. Zorin and Mr. McCloy and adopted by all Members of the United Nations; and, of course, they were quite accurate. That statement does appear there. It appears in the context of a list which calls for cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses; elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction; abolition of the organization and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States; and discontinuance of military expenditures (ENDC/5, p.2).

I think Mr. Zorin would not claim that there was not some duplication between item (a) of paragraph 3, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses, and item (c), elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction. We are quite willing to highlight the necessity and desirability of eliminating all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction along with everything else. A definition at that point, when one is doing the same thing to different things, is not of major importance. But when one is going to treat one element of military power differently from other elements of military power, one needs to know what is being talked about.

The United States delegation has made it clear, and will not repeat now, that because of the grave imbalance which we believe the Soviet proposal would call for, whatever the means, and because also of the difficulties of verification which we foresee if this proposal were carried out, we do not find the Soviet proposal a useful one. But at the same time we should like to know just what the Soviet Union means when it calls for the elimination of all potential means of delivering nuclear weapons. It was for that reason that we asked the Soviet delegation if it could not give us a clearer description of what types of armaments and vehicles it had in mind. Now Mr. Zorin has given us some help this morning. He said (supra, p.41) that that certainly included all specialized means of delivering

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

nuclear weapons; and we should agree that there are specialized means, because intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot be -- the word is not a nice one -- economically used to deliver anything except nuclear warheads. The powder of conventional weapons would not be worth the missile.

Mr. Zorin also said that all dual-purpose weapons would be included in the Soviet idea of vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons. He went on to admit that civilian aircraft could deliver nuclear weapons, and asked us to consider the idea that fighter planes might be kept. Here again, it seemed to me, he got into the difficulty of trying to distinguish between defensive and offensive equipment, because fighter planes could be fighter-bomber planes, and these could deliver nuclear weapons. Mr. Zorin dismissed the idea of civilian passenger liners or boats being used for delivering weapons, on the grounds that weapons could not be shot from the decks of such craft. But it is, of course, conceivable that a nuclear device could be concealed in a ship and taken into a harbour, and then, either by a timing device or by the sacrifice of the members of the crew, exploded.

What we were really asking for from Mr. Zorin was an answer in terms of the types of delivery vehicles that the Soviet delegation was thinking of, so that we would not have to conclude what, with the present broad definition, we must conclude: that what the Soviet proposal is really, is to carry out almost complete disarmament in the first stage so that, with the exception of troops, pistols, rifles and possibly machine-guns, everything would be eliminated in the first stage. This, to our mind, is not in keeping with the General Principles to which we have subscribed.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I think that every delegation is entitled to ask for explanations from sponsors of drafts for general and complete disarmament. I did this this morning in relation to article 8 of the Soviet draft in an attempt to reach a clearer understanding of its complicated provisions, in the full conviction that this draft is very serious and worthy of thorough study. I get the impression that the Soviet delegation does not like the kind of detailed question that I have put this morning. None of us around this table is dogmatic, however, and we ourselves should very much like to go more deeply into these problems. Mr. Zorin did not reply to my questions this morning; I hope that, with his usual kindness, he will be willing to do so at a future meeting.

(Mr. Cavallotti, Italy)

I shall add one word on the remark made this morning by Mr. Lachs concerning a certain French proposal: it is not a question of adopting a child, but of establishing paternity.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its sixty-fifth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Hassan, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Ethiopia, Burma, Romania, Italy, Poland, the Soviet Union and the United States.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 6 August 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

